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INSURER'S RIGHTS OF REIMBURSEMENT UNDER FLORIDA'S
NO-FAULT LAW*
Although the tort reparation system, has been the principal means of
compensating automobile accident victims, it has proved to be inefficient,
costly, and slow. 2 Furthermore, it has resulted in a pattern of overpayment for
lesser injuries and substantial underpayment for severe injuries.' In some instances it has resulted in no compensation at all. 4 The inequities of this traditional system have created a nationwide demand for automobile reparations
reform. 5 In 1971 Florida became the second state to meet this demand for
reform by enacting comprehensive no-fault legislation.6
Under the Florida law the right to sue in tort has been eliminated unless
certain thresholds are surpassed or the law is inapplicable.7 As a result the

"This study was made as a part of the No-Fault Impact Study conducted by the University of Florida College of Law under the supervision of Professor Joseph W. Little and
sponsored by the Council on Law-Related Studies of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Invaluable
cooperation has been provided by a Florida insurance company that wishes to remain
anonymous.
1. "Reparation" has been defined as "money or other things of value paid or bestowed
upon one who has suffered loss because of an injury to himself or to another." R. KEETON
J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC ViCriM 586 (1965).
2. See U.S. DP'T OF TRANSPORTATION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE & COMPENSATION STUDY,
MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES 100 (1971).
3. A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, et al., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS - STUDIES IN
THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 6, 196-97, 250-52 (1964) [hereinafter cited as CONARD].
See also Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
913, 933 (1962).
4. See CONARD, supra note 3, at 138-39.
5. See KEETON & O.CONNELL, supra note 1, at 49-64.
6. FLA. STAT. §§627.730-.741 (1971). The no-fault law is officially known as the Florida
Automobile Reparations Reform Act. FLA. STAT. §627.730 (1971). The constitutionality of the
Personal Injury Protection provisions of the Act were recently upheld in Lasky v. State Farm
Auto Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). Massachusetts was the first state to enact no-fault
legislation. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§34A, 34D, 34M, 34N, and ch. 231, §6D (1971). The
,271
Mass.
constitutionality of the Massachusetts law was upheld in Pinnick v. Cleary,
N.E.2d 592 (1971). The need for reform of the automobile reparations system has been a
topic of heated debate since 1932. See REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE To STUDY COMPENSATION
FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN SOCIAL

SCIENCES (1932). The writings on automobile reparations reform have been extensive. For a
bibliography see W. ROKEs, NO-FAULT INSURANCE 329 (1971). See also Comment, InsuranceMotor Vehicle, Pinnick v. Cleary, 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 123, 138 (1971).
7. The Act contains a $1,000 medical benefits threshold and a permanent injury threshold.
FLA. STAT. §627.737(2) (1971). The permanent injury threshold provision was recently inSo. 2d
validated by the Florida supreme court. Lasky v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co.,
(Fla. 1974). Also included in the original Act was a $550 property damage threshold. FLA.
STAT. §627.738(5) (1971). This threshold was invalidated by the Florida supreme court in
Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1973). The Act excludes from its coverage commercial
vehicles, government vehicles, and non-four-wheeled vehicles such as motorcycles. FLA. STAT.
§627.732(1) (1971). It also excludes out-of-state vehicles that have been within the state less
than 90 days during the preceding 365 days. FLA. STAT. §627.733(2) (1971). A recent case ex-
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tort reparations system in the state has been replaced by first-party" insurance
benefits that are payable regardless of fault.9 Advocates of the law predicted
social gains - faster payment and settlement of personal injury claims, more
equitable distribution of benefits according to actual losses sustained, lower
insurance costs because of simplified claims processing and elimination from
recoveries of noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering, and a decrease in
court congestion.' 0 In addition, no-fault was expected to provide a more efficient reparations system.
Preliminary data indicate that the no-fault law is having some of the desired effects." For the act to achieve optimum results, however, all of its provisions must operate to accomplish the above stated goals. Any one provision
operating in derogation of these goals will decrease the effectiveness of the
entire system. The reimbursement provisions of the act,'12 because of certain
inherent inconsistencies and a lack of specific standards for distribution, have
the potential of detracting from the over-all no-fault goals.
This note will examine the Personal Injury Protection (PIP) reimbursement provisions of the no-fault law, focusing upon problems created by inconsistencies therein and potential adverse effects of inconsistencies on the
no-fault system. It will suggest alternatives to present provisions based upon an
evaluation of analogous compensation schemes and no-fault reimbursement
provisions of other states, available empirical data, and applicable policy
considerations. Additionally, the note will examine the operation of reimbursement under the now defunct property damage provision of the law and the
possible effects that the adoption of comparative negligence may have on insurer's reimbursement under the no-fault law.
INSURANCE SUBROGATION:

A GENERAL

BACKGROUND

To understand fully the effect of the reimbursement provisions of the nofault law, a general awareness of the basic characteristics and functions of intended an individual's own Personal Injury Protection (PIP) policy to cover his injuries incurred while he was occupying a government vehicle. Should this trend of judicial extension
of no-fault coverage continue, Florida's Act may become much more comprehensive. See
Negron v. Travelers Ins. Co., 282 So. 2d 28, 30 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973). The law is inapplicable
where the at-fault third party is uninsured. FLA. STAT. §627.733(4) (1971). There are also
certain instances where an insurer may exclude benefits to his insured, such as where the insured is convicted of driving while intoxicated. FLA. STAT. §627.736(2)(b)(2) (1971).
8. "First-party coverage" is coverage under which the policyholder and other persons
included in the policy make direct claims against the insurance company issuing the policy.
FLORIDA No-FAULT INSURANCE PRAcTICE ch. I, at 10 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ. Practice

Manual No.
, 1972). PIP is a classic example of first-party insurance. Under PIP the insured is paid by his own insurer for medical, funeral, and disability benefits up to $5,000.
FLA. STAT. §627.736(1) (1971). Other examples of first-party insurance coverage are medical
payments insurance, collision insurance, and uninsured motorist coverage.
9. FLA. STAT. §627.731 (1971).
10. See Little, How No-Fault is Working in Florida,59 A.BA.J. 1020 (1973).
11. Id. Professor Little's article includes results of the College of Law Related Studies
(CLRS) No-Fault Impact Study.
12. FA. STAT. §627.736(3) (1971).
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surance subrogation is necessary. 13 "Subrogation" has been broadly defined as
the substitution of one party for another with regard to a lawful claim or
right. 14 There are two types of subrogation: conventional subrogation and
subrogation by operation of law." Conventional subrogation is based upon an
express agreement of the parties and governed by principles of contract law. 1
Subrogation by operation of law is based on equitable principles and arises
when an individual obligates himself to pay a debt upon which another is
liable." If an insured loss occurs and a third-party tortfeasor is primarily
liable for such loss, the insurer may be subrogated to its insured's rights and
remedies against the third party. 8 Thus, insurance subrogation is generally
classified as subrogation by operation of law. 9
Subrogation serves the general purpose of placing the burden of loss upon
the party primarily liable in law for that loss. 20 This prevents a windfall to
the third-party tortfeasor, who would otherwise escape liability if the injured
party were compensated by insurance. 2" Subrogation also prevents double recovery by the insured, thereby guaranteeing a net recovery more equivalent
to actual loss sustained 2 - and protecting the principle of indemnity.23
Not all types of insurance afford insurers subrogation rights. 24 Although

13. For a detailed analysis of subrogation in Florida, see Cappuccio, Subrogation in
Florida, 21 U. MIAI L. REV. 240 (1966). For a brief discussion of insurance subrogation generally, see R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW-BAsIC TEXT, §3.10 (1971). The only comprehensive

work on insurance subrogation is R.

HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE

(1964).
14. Whyel v. Smith, 101 Fla. 971, 974, 134 So. 552, 554 (1931). Although an accurate
definition of "subrogation" is difficult because of the complex nature of the concept, Professor Horn suggests the following: "[A] right equitable in origin and enforceable in common
law, whereby a non-volunteer, who has made payment to another party by reason of a debt
for which he is only secondarily responsible takes over that party's rights and remedies
against the third party who is primarily responsible." HORN, supra note 13, at 13-14.
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Subrogation is not an absolute right. It depends upon the equities and attending
circumstances of the particular case. Meyer v. Levy, 169 So. 2d 339, 340 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
19. Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Campbell, 104 Fla. 274, 279-80, 139 So. 886, 889 (1932).
20. De Cespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224, 226-27 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966),
afl'd, 202 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1967). See also HORN, supra note 13, at 24.
21. De Cespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224, 227 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
See also 16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §61:18 (2d ed. 1964).
22. De Cespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224, 226 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
See also HORN, supra note 13, at 24.
23. The principle of indemnity is that insurance contracts shall be interpreted and enforced so as to confer a benefit upon the insured that is no greater than the loss he has suffered. KEETON, supra note 13, §3.10(a). In protecting this principle, subrogation limits recovery
by the injured party to an amount equal to the actual value of his loss and prevents recovery
of both damages in tort and insurance benefits. De Cespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193
So. 2d 224, 226 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966), aff'd, 202 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1967).
24. With life and accident insurance it is generally recognized that the insurer is not
subrogated to claims of its insured. See KEETON, supra note 13, §3.10(c). For an in-depth discussion of which types of contracts carry subrogation rights, see HORN, supra note 13, at 27-40.
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subrogation is most commonly a feature of property insurance,25 a recent
trend suggests its extension to other types of insurance, 26 usually by the insertion of subrogation clauses within the insurance contract.27 Although some
courts refuse to recognize the validity of these clauses in certain types of insurance policies,2 s Florida courts have recognized the validity of subrogation
clauses in automobile medical payments insurance 9 and in health service
plans.3o
In exercising subrogation rights, insurance companies generally attempt to
obtain reimbursement through negotiations with the third-party tortfeasor or
his insurer. 31 Alternatively, subrogation disputes may be resolved by arbitration or litigation. 32 Arbitration, although an efficient and economical means
for resolving subrogation claims, 33 is presently of limited utility because most
arbitration agreements are limited to property damage coverage.3 4 Furthermore, since some companies are not signatories to arbitration agreements,3 5
litigation is often the only available means of collection. The costs incurred

25. Property insurance includes fire and automobile collision insurance. The value of the
loss under such policies is, in most cases, readily ascertainable. See K roN, supra note 13, at

147-48.
26. See Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MICH. L. Rv. 841

(1962).
27. Id. at 842. See also Procaccia, The Effect and Validity of Subrogation Clauses in
Insurance Policies, 1973 INs. L.J. 573.
28. This is particularly true with regard to medical benefits insurance. Kimball & Davis,
supra note 26, at 846. See also K= ON, supra note 13, §3.10(a).
29. See De Cespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966),
aff'd, 202 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1967), where the court prevented recovery by the insured from
his medical payments insurer because of a previously obtained tort recovery and execution
of a release. A recovery would have amounted to double compensation and would have
prevented the insurer from exercising his subrogation rights against the third-party tortfeasor
who held the release.
30. See Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 230 So. 2d 706 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
For a detailed discussion of subrogation in health service plans see HoRN, supra note 13, at
197-222.
31. See HoRN, supra note 13, at 110. This assertion is supported by the data assembled
in this note. See Appendix A, table 8 (dealing with subrogation method in personal injury
insurance). See also Appendix B, table 9 (dealing with subrogation method in property
damage insurance).
32. See HoRN, supra note 13, at 110.
33. Id. at 140.

34. Id. at 129. The Nationwide Intercompany Agreement is the largest and most widely
known agreement. The text of the agreement will be found in HORN, supra note 13, app. D.
The agreement requires signatories to arbitrate automobile collision and plate glass subrogation claims not in excess of $2,500 and may be used for disputes between the parties
over nonproperty damage matters with prior consent of the parties. Id. at 129. Procedurally,
an insurer may initiate a proceeding by filing a brief statement of his case with the appropriate arbitration panel. The respondent-insurer then files his answer and a hearing date
is set. Arbitration hearings are informal and cases are decided on the basis of written evi-

dence and documents in the insurer's files. Id, at 131. The o.ly direct cost to the signatory
companies is a nominal filing fee. Id. at 130,
35. Id. at 127-28.
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in litigation, however, are disproportionate to the reimbursement obtained:
Additionally, litigation may adversely affect rates and further congest already
3
overloaded court dockets. 7
Authorities have debated whether subrogation should be replaced because
of its costs and inefficiency as a means of loss distribution.3 8 Since most subrogation claims are between two insurers, each of which is an effective loss
distributing agency, it may be argued that this second round of loss shifting
is detrimental to the over-all insurance system.39 Nevertheless, the Florida
legislature's decision to retain subrogation in modified form within the nofault law40 indicates that Florida still adheres to the purposes of subrogation.
Subrogation clearly may be controlled by statute; 41 in fact, subrogation
rights may be legislatively created where none would otherwise exist.4 2 Statutory change in subrogation procedures is one means suggested to curb the costs
of subrogation without eliminating it altogether.43 This method was chosen
44
by the Florida legislature in the no-fault law.

36. Id. at 109-20. Professor Conard gives an excellent illustration of how costs increase
when litigation is necessary to effect a subrogation recovery. A $1,000 medical bill when paid
by Blue Cross costs policyholders about $1,080. If reimbursement is obtained from the thirdparty liability insurer through litigation, Blue Cross will pay at least 25% in collection expenses (attorney's fees), thus receiving a net amount of about $750. At the same time the
liability insurer would pay premium costs (the amount paid out as reimbursement plus
attorney's fees and other administrative costs) of $1,600 in its losing effort. As a result the
liability insurer expends $1,600 while the health insurer receives only $750. Since the majority of health insurance policyholders are also liability insurance policyholders, there would
seem to be no benefit to the policyholders from this shifting of loss. See Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Accidents, in DOLLARS, DELAY AND THE ACCmENT VicriM
449-50 (1968).
37. See HORN, supra note 13, at 122-23. See generally Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status,
Causes and Proposed Remedies, in DOLLARS, DELAY, AND THE AccmaIT VIsnM 151 (1968).
38. See text accompanying notes 168-175 infra. See JamesIndemnity Subrogation, and
Contributionand the Efficient Distributionof Losses, 21 NACCA L.J. 360 (1958).
39. See Kimball & Davis, supra note 26, at 870-71.
40. FLA. STAT. §627.736(3) (1971). State Representative Kenneth MacKay, a member of
the conference committee that worked out the differences between the House and Senate
versions of the no-fault bill prior to its passage, indicated that the present reimbursement
provisions were the product of compromise and were not particularly well thought out because the major objective was passage of the bill. Letter from State Representative Kenneth
H. Mackay, Jr. to Gwynne Young, Oct. 29, 1973, on file with The University of Florida Law
Review.
41. See HORN, supra note 13, at 23.
42. One such instance is Workmen's Compensation Law. See KEErON, supra note 13,

§3.10(a).
43. See HORN, supra note 13, at 121-45. The author suggests that compulsory arbitration
of subrogation claims should be instituted as an alternative to costly subrogation proceedings.
Reimbursement provisions similar to those in §1.10 of the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection
Plan are another alternative. KEErON & O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 404. Other examples of
statutory subrogation may be found in the Workmen's Compensation Law, FLA. STAT.
§440.39(3)(a) (1971), and the statute concerning secondary liability on a negotiable instrument, FLA. STAT. §46.041(3) (1971).
44. FLA. STAT. §627.736(3) (1971).
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INSURER'S REINBURSEMENT: PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION INSURANCE

All motor vehicles other than those expressly excluded by the Act4 5 are
required to carry personal injury protection insurance covering medical, surgical, and funeral costs, as well as disability benefits, payable without regard
to fault up to a limit of 5,000 dollars. 46 These benefits must be paid to the
injured claimant by his insurance company regardless of the existence of a
valid tort claim.47 The Act eliminates the right to sue in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless either the 1,000 dollar medical benefits threshold 4a or the personal injury threshold49 is surpassed. Where
these thresholds are exceeded, however, the injured party may potentially
receive PIP benefits and recover in a tort action. To prevent double recovery
the Act allows the insurer to be reimbursed for benefits paid to the injured
party.50 The reimbursement provisions of the Act found in Florida Statutes,
section 627.736(3), supplant subrogation procedures that existed prior to its
enactment. 1
In certain situations the thresholds are inapplicable. The third party who
is at fault has no tort immunity where he is uninsured,5 driving while intoxicated, 3 or driving a vehicle not required to be covered under the Act. 54 In

45. See note 7 supra.
46.

FLA. STAT.

§627.736(1) (1971).

47. Id. §627.736(3)(a).
48. Id. §627.737(2). The statute provides that damages for pain, suffering, mental
anguish, and inconvenience are eliminated unless this threshold is exceeded. The FLoimA
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCnONS §6.2 (1970) indicate, however, that other kinds of damages,
such as loss of consortium, may be actionable. There is some question, therefore, whether
suits can be brought for such damages without regard to the no-fault threshold. An argument that such suits can be brought is bolstered by legislative history. Representative
D'Alemberte offered an amendment to the no-fault bill to make §627.737 specify "all
damages allowable under law." Although the amendment was adopted in the House it was
omitted from the House-Senate draft of the Act. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 601 (May 19, 1971). The
success of no-fault may depend on the approach of lawyers and doctors to the threshold pro.
visions, since these professionals could collaborate to find damages in a given case in excess
of the threshold amounts. Reports indicate that abuse of the thresholds is a real problem
in Dade County. See Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Sept. 6, 1973, §D at 1, col. 6. The Sun reported
that a grand jury probe into these practices has begun in Dade County.
49. A plaintiff may recover damages where "the injury or disease consists in whole or
in part of permanent disfigurement, a fracture to a weight-bearing bone, a compound,
comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture, loss of a body member, permanent injury
within reasonable medical probability, permanent loss of a bodily function, or death." FLA.
STAT. §627.737(2) (1971). Recently, in Lasky v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co.,
So. 2d
(Fla.
1974), the.Florida supreme court invalidated the permanent injury portion of this provision.
The court held, however, that suit could be brought without regard to the $1,000 threshold
where death resulted.

50. FLA. STAT. §627.736(3) (1971).
51. See text accompanying notes 15-37 supra.
52. FLA. STAT. §627.73(4) (1971).
53. FLA. STAT. §627.786(2) (1971) (providing that the insurer may deny PIP benefits to
a party injured while under the influence of alcohol or narcotic drugs, while trying to intentionally injure himself, or while committing a felony). FLA. STAT. §627.738(1) (1971) pro.
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these situations PIP benefits are paid to the injured party. Additionally, tile
insurer retains full subrogation rights and is unaffected by the reimbursement
provisions of the Act.
The Statutory Conflict: Full Reimbursement or Equitable Distribution
The Florida no-fault law provides certain procedures by which an insurer
may obtain reimbursement for benefits paid to an injured party.5 Under these
procedures the insurer is not entitled to reimbursement through any action of
his own but rather as a result of the tort recovery obtained by its insured. 6
Only when the injured party fails to bring suit within one year from the date
of the last benefit paid may the insurer bring its own action. 57 Although lack
of specificity in procedural details has created some troublesome areas in the
reimbursement provisions,5 8 the major problem arises in determining the
amount of the insurer's reimbursement.
Florida Statutes, section 627.736(3), contains two separate provisions for
determining the amount of an insurer's reimbursement for PIP benefits paid.
Paragraph (3)(a) provides in part:5 9
If personal protection insurance benefits have already been received, the
claimant shall repay to the insurer or insurers, out of the recovery, a
sum equal to the benefits received, but not more than the recovery,
exclusive of attorneys' fees and other reasonable expenses incurred in
effecting the recovery, but only to the extent that the injured person
has recovered said benefits from the tort-feasor or his insurers or in-

vides that the tort exemption applies where benefits are payable. Since benefits are not payable in the above situations the tort exemption would be inapplicable.
54. See note 7 supra.
55. These procedures are contained in FLA. STAT. §627.736(3) (1971). The statute allows
the injured party to control his own lawsuit. The importance of a provision such as this is
discussed in Fidelity 9: Cas. Co. v. Bedingfield, 60 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1952). The insurer is
reimbursed from any tort recovery obtained by the insured. Although the statute contains
no specific notice provisions it may be inferred that in order to be reimbursed the insurer
must give notice of its reimbursement interest to the third party and his carrier. The only
reference to notice is found in FLA. STAT. §627.736(3)(c) (1971), which gives the no-fault insurer a right of indemnity against a tortfeasor or his insurance carrier who, with notice of
the insurer's interest, pays an amount to a tort claimant in derogation of this interest. The
amount of the insurer's reimbursement is determined pursuant to paragraphs (3)(a) and
(3)(b). The insurer may bring suit only if the insured fails to do so within one year of the
date of last benefit paid.
56. FLA. STAT. §§627.736(3)(a), (3)(b) (1971).
57. FLA. STAT. §627.736(3)(d) (1971). Before bringing an action, the insurer must give 30
days notice to the insured. Id. This provision of the statute presents several problems. The
statute provides that the insurer may bring an action only for the amount of benefits he
has paid and that prosecution or settlement of such suit without the consent of the injured
party or his legal representative will not prejudice any later action by the injured party.
These provisions seem to indicate that both the injured party and his insurer may bring
suit against the third-party tortfeasor, thereby subjecting him to a multiplicity of actions.
58. See notes 55-57 supra.
59. FLA. STAT. §627.736(3)(a) (1971).
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surer. The insurer or insurers shall have a lien on the recovery to this
extent ....
Paragraph (3)(b) provides: 60
The insurer shall be entitled to reimbursement of any payments made
under the provisions of this subsection, based upon such equitable
distribution of the amount recovered as the court may determine, less
the pro rata share of all court costs expended by the plaintiff in the
prosecution of the suit to recover such amount against a third party
tort-feasor, including a reasonable attorney's fee for the plaintiff's attorney. The proration of the reimbursement shall be made by the judge
of a trial court handling the suit to recover damages in the third party
action against the tort-feasor upon application therefore and notice to
the carrier.
The conflict between these two provisions is obvious: paragraph (3)(a) provides for full reimbursement while paragraph (3)(b) provides for reimbursement by equitable distribution. A judge attempting to ascertain the amount
of an insurer's reimbursement under the no-fault act must first determine
which provision applies. If he finds (3)(a) applicable, the insurer gets full
reimbursement and pays no attorney's fees or costs. 61 If (3)(b) controls, the
insurer gets only an equitable distribution of the recovery less a pro rata share
of costs and a reasonable attorney's fee, 62 and the judge must determine what
constitutes an equitable distribution in the no-fault context. To resolve this
dilemma, two alternative theories have arisen. Under one theory applicability
of the two provisions is determined by looking at the relationship of the
amount of the net recovery 3 to the amount of benefits paid. 64 Under the second theory applicability hinges on whether a suit has been commenced.
Under the first theory, paragraph (3)(a) applies to give the insurer full
reimbursement when the net recovery exceeds the amount of benefits paid,
while (3)(b) equitable distribution applies only when the net recovery is less
than the amount of benefits paid. Proponents of this interpretation argue that
this result is fair because even when the insurer is fully reimbursed under
(3)(a), the insured still obtains an amount equal to what he would have received had his only recovery been in tort. 65 Although this explanation of (3)(a)
seems reasonable, the interpretation of (3)(b) under the first theory is too narrow for two reasons. First, no statutory language specifically restricts the ap-

60. Id. §627.736(3)(b).
61. Id. §627.736(3)(a).
62. Id. §627.736(3)(b).

63. The term "net recovery" will be used to refer to gross recovery minus attorney's fees
and costs.
64. See Brief for Appellee at 13-15, Schwartz v. Hughey, 292 So. 2d 43 (4th D.C.A. Fla.

1974), wherein the appellee asked the court to uphold a lower court order for full reimbursement based on this theory. The court of appeal rejected this argument, however, based on
the authority of its decision in Reyes v. Banks, 292 So. 2d 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
65. Id. at 16. See also KEEroN &O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 407.
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plication of (3)(b) to cases where net recovery is less than the amount of
benefits paid. On the contrary, (3)(b) states "the insurer shall be entitled to
reimbursement of any payments made under the provisions of this subsection."6 6 By definition, the language "this subsection" refers to the entire subsection (3).67 Second, the concept of equitable distribution in tort cases existed prior to the enactment of the no-fault law, although there was no statute
requiring its application.6s Equitable considerations were employed, for example, to allocate reimbursement to insurers when net recovery was less than
benefits paid.69 Equitable allocation was not limited to this situation, however.70 Therefore, all reimbursements meeting the (3)(b) criteria appear to be
subject to equitable distribution. A more restrictive interpretation would conflict with the concept of equitable distribution 71 and could potentially cause
grossly unjust results.72

66. FiA. STAT. §627.736(3)(b) (1971) (emphasis added).
67. FLA. STAT. §627.736(3)(b) (1971) as initially enacted in Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-252,
§7(3)(b) at 1361 read in part: "(b) The insurer shall be entitled to reimbursement of any
payments made under the provisions of subsection (3) of this .... " When codified, however,
it read "entitled to reimbursement of any payments made under this subsection." FLA. STAT.
§627.736(3)(b) (1971). The legislature, therefore, intended to apply (3)(b) to the entire subsection. This view is supported by the definition of "subsection" found in the preface to
Florida Statutes. Subsections are indicated by whole Arabic numbers enclosed by parentheses;
paragraphs are indicated by lower case letters enclosed by parentheses. Preface to FLA. STAT.
at viii (1971). Thus, the subsection referred to in (3)(b) is that portion of the statute designated by (3).
68. See Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 230 So. 2d 706, 709 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1970), wherein the court stated that Blue Cross would be reimbursed based on equitable
considerations. Two other cases arising before passage of no-fault also indicate that reimbursement based upon equitable considerations was employed. See College of Law Related
Studies, file Nos. Y-088 and Y-110 [hereinafter cited as CLRS file].
69. Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 230 So. 2d 706, 709 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
70. See CLRS file Nos. Y-088, Y-150. See also text accompanying notes 110-123 infra.
71. See text accompanying notes 110-123 infra. Equitable distribution, as developed under
the Workmen's Compensation Law, is a discretionary process that is not subject to any
precise formula. The emphasis is on whether the injured party has received full compensation. Less than full compensation is received in numerous situations, only one of which is
where recovery is less than the amount of benefits paid. For example, where the insured's
damages exceed the limits of the tortfeasor's liability policy, the insured cannot receive full
reimbursement. Since the Financial Responsibility Law requires minimum coverage of only
$15,000 for bodily injury or death of one person in one accident, $30,000 for bodily injury
or death of two or more persons in one accident, and $5,000 because of injury or destruction
of property of others in any one accident, this result occurs frequently. FLA. STAT. §324.021(7)
(1971), as amended by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-180. Case law interpreting the equitable distribution provision of the Workmen's Compensation Law establishes that the judge may
grant the insurer an equitable distribution of the insured's tort recovery in any situation
where equitable considerations indicate that the insured has not received full compensation.
Limiting equitable distribution to one specific situation interferes with the judge's discretion
to apply the concept wherever equity so requires and approaches the establishment of a
precise formula, thereby conflicting with the concept of equitable distribution as developed
under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
72. A recent circuit court case is illustrative of the inequitable result that may occur
by the application of this theory. Boykin v. Reserve Ins. Co., No. 73-864.CA (Cir. Ct.
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Under the second theory, however, even when recovery exceeds benefits
paid, paragraph (3)(b) would properly be interpreted to apply to any recovery
under subsection (3) as long as a suit had been commenced. The term "recovery" as used in paragraph (3)(a) is not necessarily limited to the proceeds
from a suit, but may also include sums obtained from negotiations between

the injured party and the third-party tortfeasor or his insurer.73 Although (3)(a)
mentions attorney's fees and costs, it still seems broad enough to encompass
the aforementioned situation7 4 In contrast, the equitable distribution provision of (3)(b) seems limited to those situations where suit has been filed,
since paragraph (3)(b) specifically refers to "the prosecution of a suit to rerecover." 75 Because there is no language relating the application of (3)(b) to
the amount of the recovery, (3)(b) seems appropriate in all cases where suit
has been fied. The requirement that equitable distribution be applied for is
apparently the only limitation on its use.76
In deciding whether to utilize (3)(a) or (3)(b), a judge may follow one of
two interpretations. He may apply (3)(a) in all situations where the net recovery exceeds the amount of benefits paid, reserving (3)(b) for those situations
where the recovery is less than the amount of benefits paid; or, if a suit has
been filed, he may in his discretion apply (3)(b). Based upon careful statutory
analysis, the latter view seems preferable 77 Since the two paragraphs resist
reconciliation, both should be applicable when a suit has been filed, and the
judge should have the discretion to apply either paragraph in the absence of
any statutory requirement that he do otherwise. This interpretation is supported by the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in State Farm
78
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hauser.
The court there recognized that the

Alachua County, filed Oct. 1973). Mrs. Boykin suffered serious and permanent injuries as a
result of an auto accident: cuts and lacerations of her face, arms, legs; fractures of the left
and right clavicles; fracture of the left femur; fracture of the left pelvis; a puncture wound
of her lower intestine; rupture of the urinary bladder; and the loss of her unborn fetus. See
Petition for Equitable Distribution, Boykin v. Reserve Ins. Co., No. 73-864-CA (Cir. Ct.
Alachua County, filed Oct. 1973). Mrs. Boykin received the maximum PIP benefits ($5,000)
from her insurer. Mrs. Boykin's damages were valued at $100,000. Yet she recovered only
$20,000 in settlement from the third party as this was the limit of his liability policy. Although the equities were clearly in Mrs. Boykin's favor, the court granted the insurer full
reimbursement for PIP benefits paid. If there were ever a case in which equitable distribution should have been applied, it would be in a case such as Boykin. See Blue Cross of

Florida, Inc., v. O'Donnell, 230 So. 2d 706 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970). See also London & Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Fairfield, 132 So. 2d 459 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
73.

See BLAcK's LAW DICONARY

1440 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).

74. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
75. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
76. Id.
77. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
78. 281 So. 2d 563 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973). The Third District Court of Appeal has reaffirmed its holding in Hauser on several occasions. See, e.g., State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Mance, 292 So. 2d 52 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Murray v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 344
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973). The Fourth District Court of Appeal has also followed Hauser. See,
e.g., Reyes v. Banks, 292 So. 2d 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Schwartz v. Hughey, 292 So. 2d
43 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
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two provisions cannot be reconciled and held that when a suit has been filed
the trial court judge has the discretion to apply (3)(b) and reimburse the insurer by an equitable distribution of the recovery, even though the net recovery exceeds the amount of benefits paid.70 Relying on Hauser, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Reyes v. Banks8- not only recognized that paragraphs (a) and (b) resist reconciliation but went further, stating "there is a
positive repugnancy between paragraphs (a) and (b) . ..they are so inconsistent that they cannot be harmonized or reconciled." ' The court then determined that paragraph (b) equitable distribution should control in all cases
where it is applicable.8 2
The viewpoint that the determinative factor in deciding to apply equitable
distribution is whether suit has been commenced was further solidified by the
decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Mance.8 3 Mrs. Mance settled her tort claim for an amount in
excess of the PIP benefits she had received without filing suit. 4 The trial
court granted her petition for equitable distribution. 5 Reversing the trial
court's decision, the appellate court, relying on Hauser, reasoned "if there
were sufficient funds above the cost of arriving at a settlement without suit,
the PIP carrier is entitled to 100% reimbursement." 8
The reported case law indicates that the second theory is to be applied.8 Nonetheless, in order to determine which of the two theories is in actuality
being followed in any given case, the relationship between the amount of subrogation recovery and the total amount of personal injury payment to the
insured must be examined.88 The data indicate that the mean subrogation
recovery under PIP is 601 dollars less than the mean personal injury payment;
thus, the insurer is not receiving full reimbursement at all times. The median,
however, indicates that in a considerable number of cases the insurer is receiving full reimbursement89 The substantial difference between the mean and

79. 281 So. 2d at 565.
80. 292 So. 2d 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
81. Id. at 41.
82. Id. The court did not delineate what the specific cases are where equitable distribution is applicable. This creates the possibility that equitable distribution will be applicable in situations other than the one delineated in Hauser.
83. 292 So. 2d 52 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 53.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Reyes v. Banks, 292 So. 2d 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Schwartz v. Hughey,
292 So. 2d 43 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mance, 292 So. 2d 52 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Murray v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 344 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973); State
Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hauser, 281 So. 2d 563 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
88. See Appendix A, table 4.
89. The median for PIP in 1972 is 0.0. This statistic indicates that in at least one-half
the cases where subrogation was attempted the amount of subrogation less the amount of
personal injury payment was equal to zero. This indicates that full reimbursement is occurring in these cases.
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the median suggests that in major cases within the sample, equitable distributions of recoveries have been granted. 90
Under no-fault there has been a marked decrease in the number of subrogation claims resulting in no recovery. 91 Thus, there were fewer zero values
averaged in the computation of the mean subrogation recovery. When combined with the fact that the median shows that full reimbursement was obtained in at least half the cases, 92 this factor indicates that the difference between the mean subrogation recovery and the mean personal injury payment
must be attributable to some cause other than complete failure to recover.
Equitable distribution is an obvious means by which the insurer would receive less than full reimbursement. Although there is some evidence that
equitable distribution is being applied, the general data does not provide an
answer to the question of how courts are resolving the statutory conflict betweent (3)(a) full reimbursement and (3)(b) equitable distribution. A closer
examination of the files of major cases in which a threshold was surpassed indicates that equitable distribution is being applied more often than full reimbursement.9 3 Furthermore, if no suit were filed or if no attorney were involved the insurer received full reimbursement. 94 When an attorney was retained and suit was filed, however, equitable distribution was applied and the
insurer never received full reimbursement. 95 This pattern supports the Hauser
theory of deciding between (3)(a) or (3)(b) based upon whether a suit has been
commenced.9 6
Once the trial judge chooses to apply (3)(b), he must decide what constitutes
an equitable distribution in the no-fault context. As the statute contains no
criteria for making this determination, the judge must look to the case law.
Hauser was the first case attempting an interpretation of this provision9
After receiving $1,339.60 in PIP benefits from her insurer, State Farm, Mrs.
Hauser recovered $5,000 in settlement of her suit against the third-party carrier. 8 The trial court granted State Farm an equitable distribution of $150.
On appeal, the Third District held that an equitable distribution of $150 was
unreasonable and was, therefore, an abuse of discretion. 99 Although the court
90. This inference is based upon a careful examination of the data.
91. They decreased from 35.3% of all subrogation claims attempted under pre-no-fault
medical payments subrogation to 16.7% under no-fault PIP reimbursement.
92. See note 89 supra.
93. Although too few to be conclusive, the sample contains six major cases in which a
no-fault threshold was surpassed. In four of these cases the insurer received only partial
reimbursement. See CLRS file Nos. Y-298, Y-205, Y-210, Y-306. Full reimbursement was obtained in two cases: CLRS ifie Nos. Y-300 and Y-295.

94. In CLRS file No. 300 the insured settled with the third-party carrier who paid directly to the PIP insurer. In CLRS file No. Y-295 a similar result occurred. Settlement
would seem to be one means of ensuring full recovery by insurance companies.
95. See CLRS file Nos. Y-298, Y-205, Y-210, Y-306.

96. See text accompanying notes 73-79 supra.
97. 281 So. 2d 563 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973). See also Reyes v. Banks, 292 So. 2d 39 (4th

D.C.A. Fla. 1974); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mance, 292 So. 2d 52 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1974).
98. 281 So. 2d at 564.

99. Id. at 565.
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indicated that such a distribution might be upheld as reasonable if the record
contained "equitable considerations" sufficient to limit the insurer's reimbursement, the court did not delineate what "considerations" would be necessary
in any given case.
One factor seemed to profoundly affect the Hauser court's decision. In discussing the reasons for finding the reimbursement inadequate, the court
noted: o0
In so providing such reimbursement for equitable considerations under
paragraph (b) it should not be overlooked that under paragraph (a), for
substantially the same circumstances, provision is made for full reimbursement within the limit of net recovery.
The Hauser court thus recognized the conflict inherent in the no-fault reimbursement provisions and indicated that even if a court elects to apply
(3)(b), the presence of (3)(a) cannot be disregarded entirely but rather must
be considered as a factor in determining equitable distribution.
An examination of individual cases from the sample in which an equitable
distribution was granted reveals that the equitable distributions received by
the insurer varied in amount from thirty to fifty per cent of benefits paid. 10
These percentages are considerably higher than the percentages usually recovered as equitable distributions by insurers under the Workmen's Compensation Law. 10 2 This supports dicta in Hauser stating that allowance for full reimbursement under (3)(a) must be considered as a factor in determining what
constitutes an equitable distribution, thereby increasing the amount of insurer's recoveries under no-fault equitable distribution.
Although the Hauser court provided a method of determining when equitable distribution is to be applied, it did not establish any definitive criteria for
calculating the amount of an equitable distribution. The decision of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Reyes v. Bankso3 represents the first attempt by a Florida court to establish such guidelines. Recognizing that the
equitable distribution provision of no-fault was taken almost verbatim from
the Workmen's Compensation Law,10 4 the court based its guidelines on principles drawn from cases interpreting the older equitable distribution provision305 Although noting that equitable distribution is not susceptible to a
precise formula or exact mathematical calculation, the court delineated five
factors that it thought to be necessary in determining equitable distribution:106

100. Id.
101. CLRS file Nos. Y-298 (30%), Y-205 (50%), Y-210 (33.3% ), Y-306 (50%).
102. See, e.g., Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roth, 222 So. 2d 768 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969) (6%);
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Renton, 189 So. 2d 492 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966) (8.5%); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Harb, 170 So. 2d 54 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964) (0.08%); London & Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Fairfield, 132 So. 2d 459 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961) (6%).
103. 292 So. 2d 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
104. Id. at 42. See text accompanying note 109 infra.
105. Id.
106.

Id.
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(1) The extent, if any, to which plaintiff failed to obtain full recovery for his entire damages;
(2) The amount of the attorney's fee...
(3) The amount of expense incurred in investigating and prosecuting the claim;
(4) The amount (and value) of the time, inconvenience and responsibility involved on the part of the injured person...
(5) The fact that the client... [is responsible] for the court costs,
the investigation, the investigation costs and other expenses of litigation
while the carrier did not take this risk ....
In establishing these guidelines the court did not limit consideration solely
to five factors, rather the court recognized that the trial judge in his broad
discretion may utilize other equitable considerations in making his determination.207 Since both the data and the reported case law indicate that equitable
distribution is being employed,108 the lack of criteria for determining the
amount of distribution is perhaps of greater significance than the problem of
whether to apply equitable distribution initially. The Banks decision contributes greatly toward filling this gap in the law.
EquitableDistribution UnderFlorida'sWorkmen's CompensationLaw

As the Banks court recognized, the equitable distribution provision of nofault was taken directly from the equitable distribution provision of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law. 09 Because case law construing the no-fault
provision is still limited it is useful to examine the development of equitable
distribution under workmen's compensation as a basis for its future application under no-fault.
Under the Workmen's Compensation Law, equitable distribution is the
statutory standard applied by the trial judge in dividing the proceeds of a
recovery between the employee and the compensation carrier or employer who
has paid compensation benefits. In determining what constitutes an equitable
distribution of a recovery, the trial judge has wide discretion, 0 and his determination will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of this discretion'1 1
107. Id.
108. See text accompanying notes 90-93 supra.
109. FLA. STAT. §440.39(3)(a) (1971) provides: "Upon suit being filed the employer or
the insurance carrier ... may file in the suit a notice of payment of compensation and
medical benefits ... which said notice ... shall constitute a lien upon any judgment recovered to the extent that the court may determine to be their pro rata share ... based
upon such equitable distribution of the amount recovered as the court may determine, less
their pro rata share of all court costs expended by the plaintiff in the prosecution of the
suit including reasonableattorney's fees for plaintiff's attorney, such proration of court costs
and attorney's fees to be made by the judge of the trial court upon application therefore and
notice to the adverse party." (Emphasis added.) Compare this, with the text of FLA. STAT.
§627.736(3)(b) (1971) in text accompanying note 60 supra.
110. See, e.g., Arex Indem. Co. v. Radin, 72 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954); Security Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Grice, 172 So. 2d 834 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1965); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Bennett, 131 So. 2d 499 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
111. See, e.g., Arex Indem. Co. v. Radin, 72 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
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In arriving at an equitable distribution, the language of the statute is
conducive to neither a precise formula nor exact mathematical calculations. 1 2
Based upon equitable considerations the trial judge may grant a carrier full
reimbursement for benefits paid 3 or no reimbursement at all." 4 Among the
equitable factors to be considered are those articulated by the Supreme Court
of Florida in Arex Indemnity Co. v. Radin:"'
An endless variety of situations may arise ....

[that] may include in

any given case, a wide or narrow range between amount of medical expenses and pain and suffering involved, wide disparity between the
amount of actual damages sustained and the actual recovery possible on
any judgment obtained, and a wide range of difficulties attending the
litigation itself and the uncertainty of recovery therefrom after final
judgment.
As this statement indicates, the main consideration in determining what constitutes an equitable distribution of a recovery seems to be whether the injured party has been fully compensated for the damages sustained.
To ascertain whether an injured party has been fully compensated, the
trial judge may look at numerous factors. First, he may compare the amount
of recovery with the amount of compensation benefits paid. If the amount of
recovery is less than the amount of compensation benefits paid, the recovery is
obviously not full compensation. In such circumstances, allowing the carrier
minimal reimbursement or no reimbursement at all would not be inequitable
or an abuse of discretion. 116 Additionally, the trial judge may consider the
nature of the injury sustained. For example, an employee who received $14,000
compensation benefits for the accidental amputation of his leg, recovered a
judgment in tort of only $10,000.11 In that case the court held that a distribution of $800 to the carrier was not inequitable.," Another factor to be considered by the judge is the form of the recovery. Settlements are generally not
112. Id. at 395.
113. Baughman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 78 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1955). This seems to be
the only reported case in which a full reimbursement was granted. In Pursell v. Sumter

Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 169 So. 2d 515 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964), the court awarded the carrier
the full amount of benefits due less a prorata share of fees. The plaintiff in Pursell, however, failed to argue that the judgment should be reduced to present value and on appeal
requested equitable distribution for the first time. For this reason the court did not
specifically consider equitable distribution, so the case is not good authority for full re-

imbursement.
114. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Harb, 170 So. 2d 54 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
The jury in Harb returned a verdict of $900, the carrier had paid $1,063. The court held
that the decision not to reimburse the carrier in these circumstances was not an abuse of
discretion.
115. 72 So. 2d 393, 395 (Fla. 1954).
116. See note 114 supra. See also London & Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Fairfield, 132 So. 2d
459 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
117. This was the full extent of the tortfeasor's liability policy, therefore there was not
full compensation. London & Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Fairfield, 132 So. 2d 459 (2d D.C.A. Fla.

1961).
118. Id.
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considered to provide full compensation because of the elements of compromise involved."1 9 Specifically, settlements of final judgments in which the injured party receives or potentially will receive less than the amount of the
0
judgment do not constitute full compensation. 2 Furthermore, if the amount
an injured party can obtain from a judgment is bounded by the limits of the
tortfeasor's liability policy and his damages exceed those limits, there is not
full compensation.' 2' In all the above examples outside factors have made recovery of a full judgment impossible; therefore an equitable distribution of
the recovery providing the carrier with less than the amount of benefits expended would not be an abuse of discretion.
Although it has been argued that a jury verdict constitutes a full recovery,
the Third District Court of Appeal has held that the rendition of a jury
verdict has no effect on the discretion of a trial judge in making an equitable
distribution under the statute. 22 Among other considerations, a judge may
consider the effect that the defense attorney's arguments may have had in
mitigating the judgment against his client. 23 The reasoning of the Second
District Court of Appeal in Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Bennett 24 is exemplary of methods a judge may use to calculate an equitable
distribution. In Bennett an employee was killed in an automobile accident.
After the plaintiff widow settled her wrongful death action for $35,000, the
court granted the carrier 54,100 less a prorata share of the attorney's fees. The
judge reasoned that, since plaintiff's actual damages were approximately
$90,000, the recovery of $5,000 was no more than thirty-eight per cent of the
damages. 25 The $4,100 award was approximately forty-one per cent of sums
adequate because the
expended by the carrier. 26 The court found the award
27
settlement was not full compensation for damages.
In summary, equitable distribution under the Workmen's Compensation
Law is a discretionary process whereby full reimbursement is rarely granted
the carrier or employer. In deciding what constitutes an equitable distribution
of a recovery the judge examines the amount of the recovery, the nature of the
injury, the form of the recovery, and any other equitable considerations that

119. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McNair, 152 So. 2d 805 (Ist D.C.A. Fla.
1963); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 131 So. 2d 499 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
120. Arex Indem. Co. v. Radin, 72 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
121. London & Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Fairfield, 132 So. 2d 459 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
122. Luby Chevrolet, Inc. v. Foster, 177 So. 2d 510, 511 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
123. Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Grice, 172 So. 2d 834 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965). In Grice the
widow received a judgment for $25,000 on a wrongful death claim. The carrier was awarded
35% of its claim, or $3,855. The judge reasoned that in a common law case a verdict of
$100,000 would have been just compensation, but as a result of defense arguments as to
the possibility of her remarriage the jury had awarded only $25,000.
124. 131 So. 2d 499 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
125. Id. at 501.
126. Id. The carrier had paid or would pay the widow $10,000 for which it wanted full
reimbursement.
127. Id.
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will aid him in determining whether the injured party has received full compensation.
In comparing equitable distribution under the Workmen's Compensation
Law with the similar no-fault provision, it should be recognized that the subrogation provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law are much more explicit than the corresponding provisions of no-fault. 128 Furthermore, the Workmen's Compensation Law contains no provision comparable to paragraph
(3)(a) of the no-fault law, which appears to require dollar-for-dollar reimbursement for benefits paid by the insurer. As was indicated in Hauser, this factor
may serve to increase to some extent the insurer's reimbursement under
1 29
equitable distribution.
The equitable distribution provision of the Workmen's Compensation Law
is unique to Florida. 30 Its critics have noted that the injection of equitable
notions into the reimbursement scheme invites litigation, 13 thereby increasing
costs to the entire system and delaying the settlement of claims. A fortiori,
similar problems will arise under no-fault and will be intensified by the statutory conflict already present in the no-fault law.
Conflicting Goals: Can They Be Resolved?
The reimbursement provisions of the no-fault law alter common law subrogation rights. 13 2 To evaluate the effectiveness of this change one must ask
whether the provisions fulfill the purposes of subrogation."'3 More importantly,
one must determine whether they help achieve the over-all no-fault goals of
faster settlement of personal injury claims, more equitable distribution of
benefits according to actual losses sustained, lower insurance costs, and decreased court congestion." 34 Ultimately the no-fault provisions should aid in
providing more effective compensation for automobile accident victims. 35
By allowing full reimbursement to the insurer from the insured's tort recovery, Florida Statutes, section 627.736(3)(a), serves the basic purposes of subrogation. It places the financial burden of loss upon the third-party tortfeasor
or his insurer. Additionally, the section guarantees that the insurer of the
injured party will receive full reimbursement of the amount of benefits paid,

128. The Workmen's Compensation Law specifically provides for a method of placing
a third party on notice of the carrier's reimbursement interest. Furthermore, the statute
contains no conflicting provision such as (13)(a) of the no-fault law. Finally, the procedures
for insurer's suits are explicit. The insurer may sue for the full amount of the injured
party's damages, out of which he receives full reimbursement. FLA. STAT. §440.39(4)(a) (1971).
Thus, this provision operates to give the injured employee an incentive to bring suit; if he
does not do so he will not receive an equitable distribution.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

281 So. 2d 563, 565 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
3A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATMON LAW §74.51 (1973).
Id.
See text accompanying notes 55-63 supra.
See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
See Little, supra note 10.
See Gillespie & MacKay, Florida'sNo-Fault Insurance Law, 45 FLA. B.J. 401 (1971).
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thus insuring that the injured party's recovery is in line with his actual loss.136
Furthermore, a reimbursement provision such as paragraph (3)(a) is preferable
to subrogation because it allows control of the tort claim to remain with the
injured party.137 Additionally, since the insurer is reimbursed out of its insured's recovery and is not required to pay any attorney's fees or costs, the
expense of subrogation proceedings is eliminated. 38 Although paragraph (3)(a)
supports the goals of no-fault and of subrogation, it is questionable whether
recovery exallowing full reimbursement to the insurer in all cases where net
39
ceeds benefits paid is in the best interests of the injured party.
Unlike paragraph (3)(a), Florida Statutes, section 627.736(3)(b), injects the
vague concept of equitable distribution into the no-fault law.40 Under this
principle the insurer never receives full reimbursement and the insured always receives some double recovery.141 Moreover, the purpose of equitable
distribution is to insure the fullest recovery possible to the injured party by
decreasing the amount of the insurer's reimbursement. 142 Furthermore, the
insurer may be assessed a prorata share of the costs expended by the injured
party in obtaining the recovery as well as a reasonable attorney's fee for the
insured's attorney.'143 Although paragraph (3)(b) maximizes the recovery of the
injured party, it defeats the goals of no-fault and the purposes of subrogation.
The above discussion illustrates that the reimbursement provisions of nofault are contradictory not only in their method of calculating the amount of
the insurer's reimbursement but also in the goals each is designed to fulfill.
An examination of the actual operation of the two provisions suggests that
they often operate in derogation of over-all no-fault goals and that they therefore have done little to solve pre-no-fault subrogation problems.
The reimbursement provisions of the no-fault law prohibit direct actions
by the insurer unless the injured party fails to take action within one year of
the date of the last benefit paid. 4 4 By eliminating subrogation suits, the statute
should foster a decreased burden on the courts as well as lessen unnecessary
costs. In reality, however, the statute has done neither. Although the data
indicate there were no subrogation suits under PIP in 1972,145 this is misleading for several reasons. First, it is impossible to ascertain from the data how

136. See De Cespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966),
aff'd, 202 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1967).
137. See KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 1, at 404. FLA. STAT. §627.736(3)(a) was taken
from §1.10(c)(2) of the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan.
138. Id.
139. See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra. It has been noted that the seriously injured plaintiff rarely receives full compensation for injuries sustained. By allowing the insurer full reimbursement, the recovery is reduced even further. The Boykin case is a
perfect example of this inequity. See note 72 supra.
140. See LASON, supra note 114, §74.31.
141. See note 113 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 115-116 supra.
143. FLA. STAT. §627.736(3)(b) (1971).
144. Id. §627.736(3)(d).
145. See Appendix A, table 8.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss3/6

18

Young: Insurer's Rights of Reimbursement Under Florida's No-Fault Law
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

often reimbursement orders have been appealed, 14 6 since cases on appeal would
not yet be closed. The increasing number of reported appellate cases indicate
they are being appealed frequently. 147 Since the data, as well as the case law,
indicate that equitable distribution is being applied where suit has been commenced, 148 it is apparently to the insured's advantage to obtain counsel and
file suit, even when settlement appears imminent, in order to increase the possibilities of obtaining an equitable distribution of the recovery. 1 49 Such activity
clearly seems to lead to misuse of court resources. Moreover, it contravenes the
established policy of encouraging settlement of suits.150 This viewpoint was
emphasized by Judge Barkdull in his concurring opinion in Mance.1' 1 Finally,
since it is too early to calculate how often insurers will exercise their right to
bring suit under section 627.736(3)(d), the true impact of the reimbursement
provisions on the courts is not presently ascertainable.
The increased court activity noted above should increase costs to the nofault system. In all instances where paragraph (3)(b) equitable distribution is
applied, the statute requires that the insurance company pay a prorata share
of costs as well as a reasonable fee for plaintiff's attorney. 152 As a result, if
equitable distribution is widely used, the costs to the system will be far greater
than those created by subrogation suits prior to no-fault.'15 Although another
goal of no-fault was to expedite the settlement of personal injury claims, the
time required to settle subrogation claims has actually increased under the
no-fault law. 5 4 The time necessary to close personal injury claims is therefore

146. In order to obtain an equitable distribution of a recovery, the insured must petition the trial court for proration. The judge then issues an order granting the insurer some
amount of reimbursement. FLA. STAT. §627.736(3)(b) (1971). An executive of one large insurance company has indicated that appeals are rarely taken because the cost of the appeal
often exceeds any benefit that increased reimbursement might provide.
147. See, e.g., Reyes v. Banks, 292 So. 2d 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Schwartz v. Hughey,
292 So. 2d 43 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mance, 292 So. 2d 52 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1974); State Farm Auto Ins. Co. v. Hauser, 281 So. 2d 563 (Sd D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
148. See text accompanying notes 88-96 supra.
149. Judge Barkdull specially concurring in Mance articulated this fear. "I believe that
the Legislature should revisit this subject. It seems that the statute should not encourage
litigation, yet the only way a claimant can have equitable distribution under the precise
wording of subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b) of §627.756, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., is to institute a law
suit. This should not be the statutory requirements of this State. The policy of the law
should be to encourage settlements; not to encourage litigation." State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Mance, 292 So. 2d 52, 53-54 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
150. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1957).
151. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mance, 292 So. 2d 52, 53-54 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
152. FLA. STAT. §627.736(3)(b) (1971). Although apparently there has been a decrease in
attorney involvement in PIP cases as compared with medical payment cases prior to no-fault
(see Apendix A, table 7) lawyers will presumably be involved in all (3)(b) suits. Therefore,
the actual result may be an increase in lawyer involvement and thus very little impact upon
the legal profession.
153. An executive of a large insurance company indicated in an informal interview
that paragraph (3)(b) is greatly increasing insurers' costs. Insurance companies are occasionally required to pay attorney's fees in excess of the amount of their reimbursement.
154. See Appendix A, table 6. The data indicate that the mean settlement time for PIP
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prolonged. Although there has been an increase in the percentage of subroga155
insurers
tion claims on which insurers are obtaining some reimbursement,
56
of
subrogagoal
this
Thus,
are not necessarily obtaining full reimbursement.
tion is still not fulfilled.
The available data illustrate that the no-fault reimbursement provisions
are increasing litigation and costs and are potentially causing higher insurance
rates and delays in settlement of person] injury claims. Thus, these provisions
are operating in derogation of the goals of both subrogation and no fault. The
conflicts that the statute creates defy resolution by any means other than legislative revision.
Other State ProvisionsCompared
57
Although twenty states have enacted some form of no-fault legislation,
158
Nevertheless,
the individual statutes vary considerably in comprehensiveness.
all but five of these states have placed statutory controls on common law subrogation rights., 9 Moreover, three states have elected to prohibit subrogation
entirely. 6 0 Although double recovery often results, the latter three states have
eliminated all costs resulting from a second round of loss shifting.
An examination of those state statutes that retain subrogation in a limited
form reveals two distinct trends. First, the majority of the states require that

reimbursement claims is less than the mean settlement time for pre-no-fault medical payments subrogation claims. The median indicates, however, that the time to settle has actually
increased under PIP. Since the median is the middle value in a distribution, above and
below which lie an equal number of samples, it is less strongly influenced by a few cases of
extreme values than is the mean (average); it therefore better represents the typical situation
than does the mean.
155. See Appendix A, table 8. The insurer failed to recover on only 16.7% of all subrogation claims attempted under PIP in 1972 as compared with a failure to recover on
35.3% of all medical payments subrogations attempted in 1971.
156. See text accompanying notes 89-96 supra.
157. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§66-4014 to -4021 (1973): Colo. Laws 1973, ch. 94, at 334, to be
codified as COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§13-25-1 to 13-25-23 (effective April 1, 1974); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§38-319 to -351(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §2118 (Non-cum.
Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. §§627.730-.741 (1971); HAw. REv. STAT. §§294-1 to -39 (Supp. 1973);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§40-3101 to -3119 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§538-46 (1973);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, §§34A, 34D, 34M, 34N, and ch. 231, §6D (1971); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§500.3101-.3119 (1973); MINN. STAT. §§72A.1492-.1495 (1971); Nev. Laws 1973,
ch. 530, §§2-51, at 822 (effective Feb. 1, 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§39:6A-1 to 6A-18 (Supp.
1973); N.Y. INS. LAW §§670-77 (McKinney 1973); ORE. REv. STAT. §§743.800-.835 (1973); S.D.
LAws ANN. §§58-23-6 to 58-23-8 (1972); TrEX. INS. CODE art. 5.06-3 (1973); UTAH
CoMPIL
CODE ANN. §§31-41-1 to 31-41-13 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§38.1-380.1, 46.1-497.1 (1972); IMI.
Laws, 1971, PA 77-1430 (effective Jan. 1, 1972) (held unconstitutional in Grace v. Howlett,
41 II. App. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972)).
158. Compare S.D. CoMPiLED LAws ANN. §§58-23-6 to 58-23-8 (1972), with MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 90, §§34A, 34D, 34M, 34N, and ch. 231, §6D (1971).
159. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§66-4014 to -4021 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §2118 (1972);
MINN. STAT. §§72A.1492-.1495 (1971); S.D. Comprnm LAws ANN. §§58-23-6 to 58-23-8 (1972);
VA. CODE ANN. §§38.1-380.1, 46.1-497.1 (1972).
160. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§538-46 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §39:6A-9 (Supp. 1973);
Tax. INS. CODE art. 5.06-3 (1973).
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the no-fault insurer be reimbursed for 100 per cent of the benefits paid, thus
preventing double recovery by the insured. 161 Second, many of these statutes
are designed to prevent costly litigation over subrogation. One-third of the
states require that reimbursement be accomplished through intercompany
agreement or arbitration.162 Additionally, three states have enacted provisions
63
based upon the reimbursement sections of the Keeton-O'Connell Plan.
These statutes avoid litigation and double recovery by requiring that the insurer be fully reimbursed out of any recovery obtained by its insured. Florida
Statutes, section 627.736(3)(a), is in this category.
Since no other state has a reimbursement provision similar to Florida
Statutes, section 627.736(3)(b), this provision is as great an anomaly in no-fault
legislation as it is in Workmen's Compensation Law. 6 4 No other state has
enacted two different provisions controlling the amount of the insurer's reimbursement without clearly delineating in what instances each is applicable. 6 5 In fact, other states have avoided the pitfalls found in the Florida reimbursement provisions by wisely enacting provisions containing specific distribution criteria.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The shortcomings of the present PIP reimbursement provisions are obvious.
The conflict between (3)(a) full reimbursement and (3)(b) equitable distribution, as well as the uncertainty inherent in calculating equitable distribution,
can result only in additional litigation, increased costs, and unneeded delay
in settling tort claims. The provisions undermine the purpose of subrogation'6 6 as well as the goals of no-fault.16 The issue is not whether the legislature should change the law (unquestionably it must) but rather what form the
new law should take.
Since the legislature should select an alternative to the present PIP reimbursement provisions that best promotes the over-all no-fault goals, the best
solution would be to eliminate reimbursement entirely. Although this solution
seems drastic, the arguments supporting it are persuasive. Subrogation is de-

161. Hawaii is the only state that provides a specific formula for reimbursement. The
Hawaii statute allows the insurer to be subrogated to 50% of all no-fault benefits paid.
HAW. REV. STAT. §294-7 (Supp. 1973).

162. MAss.

GEN.

LAws

ANN.

ch. 90, §§34A, 34D, 34M, 34N, and ch. 231, §6D (1971); Nev.

Laws 1973, ch. 530, §30, at 822 (effective Feb. 1, 1974; N.Y. INs. LAW §674 (McKinney 1973);
ORE. REV. STAT. §743.830 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §31-41-11 (1973).
163. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §38-325 (Cum. Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §40-3113 (Supp.
1973); MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §500.3116 (1974).
164. See note 130 supra.

165. For example, Colorado allows the insurer to take direct action against the tortfeasor to the extent of benefits paid in excess of $500 where the tortleasor was driving a
passenger vehicle. All benefits are recoverable if the at-fault vehicle was a nonpassenger
vehicle. Colo. Laws 1973, ch. 94, at 334, to be codified as COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-25-17

(effective April 1, 1974).
166. See text accompanying notes 132-156 supra.
167.

Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1974], Art. 6

1974]

REIMBURSEMENT UNDER FLORIDA'S NO-FAULT LAW

signed to place the financial burden of loss upon the party liable for that loss
and to prevent double recovery by the insured.1 6 8 In most instances, however,
subrogation or reimbursement shifts the burden of loss not to the third-party
tortfeasor, but to his insurance carrier. Thus, the first purpose of subrogation
is not fulfilled. There is little social value in repeated loss shifting from one
insurer to another.16 9 Generally, what one insurer gains as subrogation recovery
will be paid to other insurers on future subrogation claims, resulting in a
balancing effect.' 7 0 Therefore, the only loss is the cost of obtaining the subrogation recovery, and this cost will be passed on to the consumer in the form
7
of rate increases. '
Furthermore, since the insurer has contracted to absorb the loss, it should
not receive the windfall of subrogation recovery. 7 2 Authorities point out that
subrogation recoveries do not directly benefit the insured; his rates are determined on the basis of the insured loss he has caused.'7 3 This loss is not
mitigated by the subrogation recovery. 7 4 Thus, subrogation primarily benefits
the insurer. The better view, therefore, would be to require that the initial
loss distributing agency - in Florida the PIP insurer - sustain the loss. 175
Insurance subrogation should not be completely done away with. In some
instances, however, because of the nature of the social goals involved, it may
be wise to eliminate reimbursement. Since the no-fault thresholds have al76
the PIP
ready eliminated subrogation in a substantial number of cases,
reimbursement provisions are presently applicable only in major cases. Although proponents of subrogation argue that double recovery is undesirable,77
in these cases the adverse effects of double recovery would be minimal.17a Since

168 See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
169. See James, supra note 38. See also Kimball & Davis, supra note 26. Contra, HORN,
supra note 13, at 109. Although Professor Horn argues persuasively that subrogation is
worth retaining, he is referring generally to property damage insurance.
170. See Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Accidents, in Do.As, DELAY, An TmE AccmENT VICaM 449-51 (1972).
171. See HORN, supra note 13, at 25-26.
172.

"Subrogation is a windfall to the insurer. It plays no part in the rate schedules (or

only a minor one), and no reduction is made in insuring interest ....Even as to tortfeasors,
it is arguable that since the insurer is paid to take the risk of negligent losses, it should not
shift the loss to another." E. PATrERSON, ESSENTIALs OF INsURANCE LAW 151 (2d ed. 1957).
173. A Florida district court in De Cespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224,
227-28 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966), aff'd, 202 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1967), aptly expressed similar sentiments: "Admittedly, subrogation has been a two-edged sword. Unfortunately, it has fre-

quently become a source of windfall to insurers in that the anticipated recoveries under
subrogation rights are generally not reflected in the computation of premium rates."
174. PATrERSON, supra note 172, at 151.

175. See James, supra note 38.
176. FLA. STAT. §627.737(2) (1971). One large insurer estimated that between 88%5 and
90% of pre-no-fault claims were settled for less than $1,000. Thus, the $1,000 medical benefits
threshold will potentially eliminate a substantial number of claims. See also Little, supra
note 10, at 1021.
177. See HORN,supra note 13, at 26. See also De Cespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co.,
193 So. 2d 224, 226-27 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966), -af'd,202 So. 2d 501 (Fla.1967).
178. "Victims of severe accidents do pot fare much better in their attempts to be
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statistics show that the injured party is least likely to receive full compensation
in the major cases, 179 disallowing reimbursement and permitting double recovery might produce a more equitable result. Moreover, the current reimbursement provisions can only lead to additional litigation, 80 with a resulting
increase in costs to the system, which are passed on to the consumer via rate
increases.18 1 To achieve results most beneficial to the entire Florida no-fault
system, the legislature should entirely eliminate subrogation in the personal
82
injury provisions of the no-fault law.
Should the legislature decide not to eliminate subrogation entirely, however, there are several possible alternatives.8 3 Since Florida Statutes, section
627.736(3)(b), is the source of most problems in no-fault, 8 4 that paragraph
must be eliminated. As previously indicated Florida Statutes, section 627.736
(3)(a), is designed to eliminate costly litigation and double recovery. 8 5 Thus,
(3)(a) standing alone supports the goals of subrogation and no-fault generally.
Should the legislature choose to retain the present provision without (3)(b), it
must clearly delineate the procedures for obtaining reimbursement. 1s o
Retention of the present provision without equitable distribution would
lead to a reimbursement system more efficient than either the one that presently exists or subrogation as it existed prior to no-fault. Nevertheless, this
would not be as beneficial to the injured plaintiff or to the entire system as
would be the abrogation of PIP reimbursement.

indemnified by sources other than their own health carriers. Thus, the most badly hurt 1%
of all accident victims account for 6% of the total economic losses in all automoblie crashes,
yet they recover only 1% of the total recoveries for all crashes. Since theirs is also the
heaviest non-economic loss the ratio of their actual recoveries to the true total loss is being
reduced even further .... Thus in typical cases, subrogation in the personal injury lines
denies the insured whatever chance he could otherwise have had to be indemnified, and
thus, rehabilitated." See Procaccia, supra note 27, at 585-86.
179. The Michigan study conducted by Conard and his colleagues is the most extensive
study of this problem. Conard concluded that those with losses over $10,000 are unlikely to
approach full reimbursement. See Conard, supra note 3, at 179 (1964). See also KMroN &
O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 43-49.
180. See text accompanying notes 132-156 supra.
181. See HORN, supra note 13, at 109-120.
182. Three other states have chosen to eliminate subrogation in the personal injury
provisions of their no-fault laws. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§538-46 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§39:6A-9 (Supp. 1973); TEX.INS. CODE art. 5.06-3 (1973).
183. First, the legislature may choose to retain (3)(a) thus allowing the insurer full
reimbursement without necessity of expensive subrogation proceedings. Second, it may allow
subrogation action by the insurance company where thresholds are surpassed and eliminate
the problem of costly litigation by requiring that settlement be by intercompany agreement,
or if that fails, by arbitration. Third, it may deny the insurer reimbursement, but prevent
double recovery by the insured by deducting the amount of benefits paid from the amount
of the tort recovery.
184. See text accompanying notes 140-143 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 136-137 supra.
186. See notes 55-58 supra.
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INSURER'S REIMBURSEMENT: PROPERTY DAMAGE

With the invalidation of the no-fault property damage provision by the
Supreme Court of Florida in Kluger v. White,18 7 the Florida legislature is now
confronted with the problem of whether to reenact some form of property
damage coverage. A comparison of subrogation under the no-fault property
damage provision with pre-no-fault collision subrogation may be useful for
legislative purposes.
Prior to the enactment of no-fault, motor vehicle owners could purchase
collision insurance covering property damage to the owner's vehicle regardless
of fault."8 Although the motor vehicle owner was not required under the nofault law to carry first-party property damage coverage, 8 9 he could purchase
full coverage for property damage to his vehicle regardless of fault. 90 The
owner could also purchase Basic Property Protection (BPP) for property
damage to the insured vehicle caused by an at-fault third-party vehicle for
which PIP security was required by the Act.191 Whether or not an owner
elected to purchase property damage coverage, the right to sue in tort was
eliminated unless total damage to the vehicle in question exceeded $550.92
Therefore, the person who elected to carry no coverage and had property
damage less than $550 was effectively deprived of any means of recovering his
loss. For this reason, the property damage provision of the Act was declared
unconstitutional. 9 3
In property damage, as in PIP, the insurer had subrogation rights whenever
the threshold was surpassed. 94 If the insured vehicle was parked, if the tortfeasor was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct, if the third party operated the vehicle without its owner's consent, or if the other vehicle was uninsured, there was no monetary threshold to the insurer's subrogation rights.9
Additionally, insurers were allowed to pursue subrogation claims for rental
reimbursement paid regardless of whether vehicle damage exceeded $550."96

187. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
188. See KEzrON & O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 69. Usually collision insurance contracts
provide for deductibles of $50 or $100. See HoRN, supra note 13, at 43.
189. F A. STAT. §627.738(1) (1971).
190. Id. §627.738(2)(a).
191. Id. §627.738(2)(b). The owner also had the option not to purchase coverage. Id.
§627.738(5).
192. Id. §627.738(5).
193. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973). Specifically, the provision was found
to violate FLA. CoNsT., art. I, §21, which reads: "The courts shall be open to every person for

redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
194. FILA. STAT. §627.738(5) (1971) provides in part: "The insurer of an owner who has
elected to purchase full or basic collision coverage for his motor vehicle shall have the right,
if the damage to such motor vehicle exceeds the above amount [$550] to recover the amount
of the benefits it has paid, and, on the behalf of its insured, any deductible amount ....
195.

Id. §627.738(4).

196. 1 FLA. ADmIN. CODE "§4-27.12 (1971) provides in part: "(a) ... if the basic property
protection is determined to be applicable, the insurer providing the basic property protection will reimburse the collision insurer and pay the insured any deductible withheld by the
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Moreover, there was no provision such as (3)(b) equitable distribution included
in the property statute.
If the third party was insured, the statute expressly granted the insurer the
97
right to recovery from the third-party insurance carrier for property damage.1
The statute was unclear, however, as to who had the right to recover when
the third party was uninsured. 9 The statute eliminated litigation by requiring that subrogation claims be settled by intercompany agreement or by arbitration. 99 As would be expected a substantial majority of BPP settlements
were obtained through intercompany agreement. 200 Moreover, under pre-nofault law only three per cent of the subrogation claims were settled by suit.2o"
Additionally, attorneys were rarely involved in property damage subrogation
claims either prior to no-fault or under no-fault BPP.20 2
Perhaps the only major difference between pre-no-fault collision and BPP
is in the area of rental reimbursement. Rental reimbursement was practically
nonexistent before no-fault.203 In contrast, rental reimbursement was paid in
one-third of the 1972 BPP cases and in almost one-half of the 1973 cases.204
Rental reimbursement could be subrogated from the first dollar and could not
be included in the total property damage payment for purposes of determining
whether a threshold had been surpassed. 205
The data indicate subrogation in property damage has always been efficient and economical. Unlike personal injury reimbursement, there has been
a minimum of litigation and costs have therefore not increased. By requiring
that settlement be by intercompany agreement or arbitration, the no-fault law
apparently eliminated the small amount of litigation that did exist. Furthermore, efficiency of the system was increased in several other ways. For example,
insurers recovered on 94.2 per cent of all BPP subrogations attempted in 1972
as compared with only 61 per cent of all collision subrogations in 1971.206
Additionally, the time required to settle subrogation claims under no-fault
BPP was reduced to half the time required to settle pre-no-fault collision
0
claims.2 7
Since property damage subrogation, unlike PIP reimbursement, did not
adversely affect the over-all no-fault system there would seem to be no need
collision insurer and any rental reimbursement due under the terms of the basic property
protection coverage." (Emphasis added.)
197. FLA. STAT. §627.738(5) (1971).

198. Available data indicate that in most instances the insurer recovered. See Appendix
B, table 9.
199. FLA. STAT. §627.738(5) (1971).
200. See Appendix B, table 9.
201. Id.
202. See Appendix B, table 8.
203. The data indicate that apparently the only case in which rental was reimbursed
prior to no-fault was one in which the payment was made by mistake. CLRS File No. Y-003.
204. See Appendix B, table 3.
205. See 1 FLA. ADMIN. CODE §4-27.18 (1971). The words "property damage" referred to
in FLA. STAT. §§627.738(4), (5) (1971) mean actual physical damage to the motor vehicle.
206. See Appendix B, table 9.
207. See Appendix B, table 7.
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to abolish it. There would also seem to be little need to reenact a no-fault
property damage provision including a property damage threshold. 20° Nevertheless, the Florida legislature may want to enact certain beneficial aspects of
no-fault property damage, such as the requirement that all property damage
subrogation be effected by intercompany agreement or arbitration. By so doing,
litigation over subrogation claims would be prevented and maximum efficiency
in property damage subrogation would be achieved.
EFFECT OF THE ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

The Supreme Court of Florida recently discarded the "harsh and inequitable" rule of contributory negligence 209 and adopted comparative negligence.210
The court has thus taken another step toward securing just and adequate
compensation for Florida's automobile accident victims. Under the pure form
of comparative negligence adopted by Florida,211 the claimant's damages are
diminished in proportion to his own negligence. 212
Although some commentators suggest that comparative negligence can be
implemented as an alternative to no-fault, 213 there is no reason why the two
cannot coexist. Comparative negligence will have no effect on PIP claims; in
fact, its only effect will be in those situations where a valid tort claim exists.214
Moreover, comparative negligence may aid in the attainment of some over-all

208. Most of the problems inherent in personal injury subrogation due to noneconomic
loss factors such as pain and suffering are not present in property damage. Property damage
involves readily ascertainable values. Furthermore, pre-no-fault collision coverage was firstparty insurance. The insured was paid for his damages regardless of fault. Thus, collisioncoverage already encompassed the major attributes of no-fault. Also, the threshold would

seem to have no real effect, since there was very little litigation in pre-no-fault collision to
be eliminated. Indeed, the threshold may have had the adverse effect of causing the inflation
of damages in order to exceed the threshold. See generally Little, Impact of Property
Damage No Fault Insurance in Florida: Preliminary Report, Sept. 5, 1973 (unpublished
work on file with University of FloridaLaw Review).

209. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
210. Twenty states have now adopted comparative negligence either judicially or by
statute. See Fisher & Wax, Comparative Negligence-Some
Unanswered Questions, 47 FLA.
B.J. 566, 567 (1973).
211. 280 So. 2d at 438. The Mississippi statute is exemplary of the "pure form." Miss.
CODE ANN. §1454 (1966). The other forms are "modified" comparative negligence, which
provides for apportionment so long as the plaintiff's negligence is not equal to or greater
than that of the defendant, e.g., 'Wis. STAT. ANN. §331.045 (1958) and "gross-slight" comparative negligence, which provides that damages will be apportioned as long as the negligence
of the plaintiff is slight in comparison to that of the defendant. E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAws
ANN. §20-9-2 (1967).
212. The court in adopting comparative negligence left many unanswered questions as
to the practical aspects of its implementation. These problems are beyond the scope of this
note. See Fisher & Wax, supra note 210, at 567.
213. In a study of the automobile reparations system, the ABA made this recommendation. See REPORT OF TiE ABA SPECIAL CoMM. ON AuToMoBa
AccmENe REPARATIONS 75
(1969). See also Krause, No-Fault's Alternative - The Case for Comparative Negligence and
Compulsory Arbitration in New York, 44 N.Y.S.B.J. 535 (1972).
214. See KEzrON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 1,at 519-22.
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no-fault goals by bringing recoveries more in line with economic losses, decreasing over-all costs, and eventually reducing rates.
Comparative negligence will have a definite effect on the insurer's reimbursement rights. Data from this study indicate that contributory negligence
is one of the three leading factors preventing insurers from collecting on
otherwise valid subrogation claims. 215 In 1972 contributory negligence was a
factor in preventing recovery in 15 per cent of all cases where no recovery was
obtained. 216 Because of the unique nature of the reimbursement provisions of
no-fault, comparative negligence may create additional problems in determining the amount of insurers' reimbursements.
Section 627.736(3)(a) provides for full reimbursement where net recovery
exceeds the amount of benefits paid "but only to the extent that the injured
party has recovered said benefits from the tortfeasor." 217 Arguably, if a claimant's recovery under comparative negligence has been reduced by a certain
percentage, he has only recovered no-fault benefits to the extent of that percentage of the total amount of benefits paid. Reimbursement percentages,
therefore, should be valued with relation to total injury and not with relation
to damages payable under comparative negligence rules. Thus, the insurer
should recover from his insured a percentage of the total benefits he has paid
equal to the percentage of total damages that the insured recovered under
comparative negligence rules. This result is bolstered by the established principle that an insurer's subrogation rights are dependent upon the rights of its
insured.218
The effect of comparative negligence on subsection 627.736(3)(b) equitable
distribution is somewhat more speculative. It seems that the major factor in
determining the amount of equitable distribution is whether the injured party
receives full compensation. 21 9 If the comparative negligence rule has been
applied to reduce the amount of recovery, the injured party never receives full
compensation. By this reasoning, the insurer should receive little or no reimbursement in order that the injured party's recovery can be maximized.
Alternatively, the court could order reimbursement of the insurer by that per
cent of the amount of benefits paid that corresponds to the percentage of the
insured's fault.220 Perhaps the more rational approach would be to view the
percentage of fault as another "equitable consideration" to be weighed by the
judge along with the other factors used in determining equitable distribution.221

Clearly, the adoption of comparative negligence will be beneficial to the
over-all automobile reparations system. Nevertheless, it may aggravate the

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
tion. See
221.

See Appendix C, table 1.
Id.
FLA. STAT. §627.736(3)(a) (1971).
Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Campbell, 104 Fla. 274, 139 So. 886 (1932).
See text accompanying notes 116-121 supra.
This, however, is not only mechanical but alien to the concepts of equitable distribunote 71 supra.
See text accompanying notes 115-127 supra.
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problems inherent in no-fault reimbursement provisions by creating another
litigable issue.
CONCLUSION

Florida has been a leader in initiating automobile reparations reform. The
legislative enactment of no-fault followed by the judicial adoption of comparative negligence illustrates a dedication to just and adequate compensation of
automobile accident victims. Nonetheless, reform must not end with the initial
breakthroughs. In order to assure attainment of the goals of no-fault, the
legislature must continue to examine and refine the law in light of its original
objectives.

This note has indicated the inadequacies of present PIP reimbursement
provisions of the Act and has suggested possible alternatives to the present
provisions. It is incumbent upon the legislature to amend the reimbursement
provisions and thus enable no-fault to achieve optimum results.
GWYNNE ALICE YOUNG

APPENDIX A
This study was conducted using closed subrogation files of a Florida insurance company
as a primary data source. Cases arising out of accidents occurring in 1971 made a pre-no-fault
sample. Cases in 1972 made a no-fault sample. There are presently too few 1973 PIP subrogation cases to obtain any useful data.
The objectives of the study were two-fold. First, to make a general comparison of no-fault
reimbursement with pre-no-fault subrogation to determine what changes have occurred.
Second, to determine how the conflict between (3)(a) full reimbursement and (3)(b) equitable
distribution is being resolved. The aim was to ascertain the nature of insurer's reimbursement under no-fault and to determine its actual impact on the over-all no-fault system.
Because this data necessarily includes subrogations on all PIP payments, whether the
medical benefits or permanent injury thresholds were surpassed or inapplicable, the median
PIP payment is below the $1,000 threshold. See table 2. The inclusion of those smaller
cases provides a more accurate indication of trends within the entire reimbursement system;
however, it tends to obscure the results from the major cases where either the medical benefits or permanent injury threshold was surpassed. It is in PIP reimbursement claims in
major cases that the conflict between full reimbursement and equitable distribution occurs.
Many of these cases are just reaching the courts; therefore, the data are incomplete.
TABLE 1

Verified Medical Expenses
Medical Payments 1971
Mean
Median
n* =

$645
116
33

PIP 1972
$846
447
24

"n is the number of cases in the sample.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss3/6

28

Young: Insurer's Rights of Reimbursement Under Florida's No-Fault Law
[Vol. XXVI

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA. LAW REVIEW
TABLE 2

Total PersonalInjury Payment

Medical Payments 1971
Mean
Median
n=

$729
120
34

PIP 1972
$1,179
650
24

TABLE 3

Amount of Subrogation Recovery
Medical Payments 1971
Mean
Median

PIP 1972
$562
230
24

$260
25

TABLE 4
Amount of Subrogation Recovery Less Total PersonalInjury Payment
Medical Payments 1971

PIP 1972

.$-468

$--601

55
34

0
24

Mean
Median
n=

-

TAB.

5

Case Value = Total Personal Injury Payment Less Total Verified Medical Expenses
Medical Payments 1971
Mean
Median
n =

PIP 1972
$84
0
24

$--153

0

TABLE 6
Time To Settle Subrogation Claim

Medical Payments 1971

PIP 1972
178 (days)
167 (days)

235 (days)
144 (days)

Mean
Median

TABLE 7
Lawyer Involvement
Medical Payments 1971

PIP 1972

"No" (or probably not)
"Yes" (no suit)
"Yes" (suit)

17 (73.9%)
4 (17.4%)

"Yes"
n =

0
23

21 (65.50o)
7 (21.9%)
3 (9.4%)
I (3.1%)
(questionable suit)
82
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TABLE 8
SubrogationMethod
PIP 1972

Medical Payments 1971

Intercompany Agreement
Suit
Agreement with Third
Party
Attempted Subrogation
No Recovery
Other
n=

9 (26.5%)

2 (5_9%)
4 (11.8%)
12 (35.3%)
7 (20.6%)

11 (45.8%)
0
2

(8.3%)

4 (16.7%)

7 (292%)
24

APPENDIX B
The data reported here deal with the actual operation of no-fault property damage subrogation. They represent subrogation of property damage claims arising out of accidents
occurring during June and July of 1971 and 1972. The data exclude vehicles not covered by
the no-fault law. The cases in the sample were settled prior to invalidation of the property
damage provision.
TABLE I
Total Property DamagePaid
BPP

Collision
1971
Mean
Median
n=

$713
380
103

1972

1973

1,092
647
23

410
280
31

1973

1972

TABLE 2

Cost of Repairs
BPP

Collision

1972

1973
476
325
31

1,135
685
23

Mean
Median
n =

1972

1973

$785
672
76

549
340
70

TABLE 3
Rental Reimbursement Paid
BPP

Collision

Mean

Median
n=
% Total

16.67
0
3
2.9%
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151
125
26
34.2%

133
105
32
45.7%
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TABLE 4
Amount of Subrogation Recovery
Collision

1971

1972

$376
150
103

Mean
Median
n =

BPP
1972

930
547
23

1973

$675
670
76

496
290
70

TABLE 5
Total Subrogation Recovery Less Total PropertyDamage Payment
Collision
1971
Mean
Median
n =

BP'p

1972

$--336
- 70
103

1973

-161

1972

-182

0
25

1973

$--159
-20
76

0
31

-125
0
70

TABLE 6

Case Value = Total Property Damage Payment Less Actual Cost of Repairs
Collision

Mean
Median
n =

BPP

1971

1972

1973

1972

$--59
-51
103

-43
-45
23

-66
-48
31

$50
8
76

1973
72
3
70

TABLE 7
Time To Settle Subrogation Claim
Collision

1971
Mean
Median
n =

BPP

1972

199 (days)
131
103

1973

95
78
23

51
46
31

1972

1973

102
74
76

65
52
70

TABLE 8
Lawyer Involvement
Collision

BPP
1972

"No" (or probably
not)
"Yes" (no suit)
"Yes" (suit)
"Yes" (questionable
suit)

87 (85.3%)
10 (9.8%)
4 (3.9%)

22 (95.7%)
0
1 (4.3%)

1 (1.0%)

0 (0.0%)
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51 (100.0%)
0
0

0

73 (96.1%)
2

1973

70 (100%)

1 (1.3%)

0
0

0

0
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TABLE 9
SubrogationMethod
Collision

Intercompany
Agreement
Suit
Agree Third Party
Attempted Suit
No Recovery
Other
n -

1971

BPP

1972

1973

1972

1973

38 (36.9%)
3 (2.9%)
14 (13.6%)

15 (65.2%)
0
3 (13.0%)

19 (61.3%)
0
2 (6.5%)

58 (76.3%)
0
5 (6.6%)

57 (81.4%)
0
2 (2.9%)

41 (39.8%)
7 (6.8%)
103

4 (17.4%)
1 (4.3%)
23

10 (32.3%)
0
31

12
1
76

11 (15.7%)
0
70

(5.8%)
(1.3%)

APPENDIX C
TABLE 1
Reasons Why Could Not Recover on Subrogation Claim

Third Party Uninsured
Third Party Could Not Be Located
Contributory Negligence
Out-of-State Third Party
Third Party Vehicle Stolen
Insured Signed Release
Unable To Determine Fault
Could Not Reach Agreement with Other Parties
Other Insurance Company Would Not Reimburse
Medical Payments
Do Not Know
n =
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1973

1971

1972

12
19
13
0
0
0
2
1

9
3
2
1
1
1
0
0

11
6
4
1
0
0
0
0

2
1
50

0
0
17

0
1
23
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